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RECENT CASES

MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
Supreme Court Holds Aggregate Limits on Campaign
Contributions Unconstitutional
Stephen M. DeGenaro*
INTRODUCTION
1

Campaign finance law “is a matter of First Amendment concern.”
Political speech has long enjoyed coveted status as a category of speech
most fundamental to the U.S. system of governance, thus warranting robust
2
protection. A person choosing to spend money in connection with a
candidate or ballot initiative implicates protections of the First Amendment
because such actions are a form of both political expression and

© 2014 Stephen M. DeGenaro. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Recent Case in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2014; Bachelor of Arts,
Georgetown University, Class of 2011. I would like to thank Professor Randy J. Kozel for
providing invaluable background knowledge and assistance on a paper from which this Case
Comment developed. I would also like to thank the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their top-notch editing in preparing this Case Comment for publication. All errors are my
own.
1 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
2 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means,
an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 270 (discussing the fact that the First Amendment reflects a
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
28
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3

association. Campaign finance regulation is demarcated based upon the
4
form that the political expression or association takes. Restrictions on
expenditures—money spent by the donor or speaker to express support for
5
the candidate or issue—fail to satisfy strict scrutiny. Restrictions on
contributions—money given by the donor or speaker directly to the
candidate or issue—will be upheld by a court when “the State demonstrates
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
6
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” For purposes of
establishing a sufficiently important interest, the government may seek to
eliminate actual or apparent corruption in politics, but may neither seek to
eliminate the amount of money spent in elections nor increase the influence
7
of groups.
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission involved a challenge to
limits imposed on the amount a donor may contribute during a single
8
election cycle. In McCutcheon, the Court was presented with the question
of whether the aggregate limits placed on contributions to candidate and
3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam). Expressional freedoms
under the First Amendment are so robust as to extend equal protection to unpopular as well
as popular speech. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012)
(declaring unconstitutional a federal law criminalizing the act of lying about receipt of
military decorations); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam)
(striking down a state statute that criminalized mere advocacy for violence to affect political
change, rather than “incitement to lawless action,” thereby upholding the right of members
of the KKK to hold a rally where the rally falls short of “incitement”). The Supreme Court
has recognized associational freedoms within the realm of political speech both generally,
see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”), and specifically, see Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973) (“There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to
associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of
orderly group activity protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
4 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–13.
5 Id. at 58–59; see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989) (“The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.”).
6 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
7 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2825–27 (2011).
8 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). The Federal Election Commission is
an independent administrative agency tasked with administering and enforcing the laws that
govern federal elections. See About the FEC, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last
visited Dec. 27, 2014). For a general discussion about the binding nature of various
administrative agency actions, see Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should We Care About
An Agency’s Special Insight?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909 (2013).
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noncandidate committees either lacked a cognizable constitutional interest
9
or were unconstitutionally too low. In a five to four decision, the Supreme
Court held that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions burden
substantial First Amendment rights without furthering a permissible
10
government interest.
I.

HISTORY

The Federal Election Commission Act (FECA), as amended by the
11
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), has two different types of
12
contribution limitations. Base limits restrict the amount of money a donor
13
may contribute to any single candidate or committee. Aggregate limits
restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute to all candidates or
14
committees during a single election cycle. Any single contribution may
violate the base limits, aggregate limits, or both, depending on how much
money the donor has already contributed during an election cycle. For
example, during the 2013–2014 election cycle, FECA’s base limits
permitted an individual to contribute up to $2600 per election to any
particular candidate, while FECA’s aggregate limits permitted
15
contributions up to $48,600 to federal candidates. A donor attempting to
give $3000 to a congressional candidate after having already contributed
$48,000 to other federal candidates would violate both the base and
aggregate limits. If the donor instead chose to limit his contribution to the
$2600 amount permitted under the base limits, the donor would still violate
the aggregate limits because the contributions exceed the $48,600 limit.
This would be true even for smaller contributions, because any amount
donated to the candidate over $600 would exceed the aggregate limits for
the 2013–2014 election cycle.
Shawn McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who sought to make a
series of contributions to various federal candidates for office during the
2011–2012 election cycle. In total, McCutcheon lawfully contributed
$33,088 to sixteen different federal candidates and $27,328 to numerous
16
noncandidate political committees.
McCutcheon wished to contribute
$1776 to twelve additional candidates, but FECA’s aggregate limits

McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012).
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (West 2014).
See id. §§ 30116(a)(1), 30116(a)(3).
§ 30116(a)(1).
§ 30116(a)(3).
Senate General Election Expenditure Limits for the 2013–2014 Election Cycle, 78
Fed. Reg. 8532 (Feb. 6, 2013).
16 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1443 (2014).
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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17

prevented him from doing so. McCutcheon, along with the Republican
National Committee (RNC), brought a First Amendment challenge in
federal court in 2012, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the
18
aggregate limits. McCutcheon and the RNC argued that the challenged
aggregate limits were “unsupported by any cognizable government
19
interest . . . at any level of review” and were unconstitutionally low.
A three-judge district court panel denied McCutcheon and the RNC’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election
20
Commission’s motion to dismiss.
The district court rejected
McCutcheon’s argument that strict scrutiny ought to be applied to the
21
aggregate limitations based on First Amendment precedent. The district
court found that the government’s sufficiently important interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is furthered by limits
that prevent the circumvention of contribution limits. The district court
first observed that the government’s interest in preventing corruption was
limited to quid pro quo corruption—direct contributions to political
22
candidates in exchange for political favors —and that mere influence or
access to a candidate or officeholder did not rise to the level of
23
corruption.
To that end, however, the district court found that the
aggregate limits helped prevent the evasion of the base limits—the latter of
24
which unquestionably implicate the government’s anticorruption interest.
In support of this conclusion, the district court mentioned that, without the
aggregate limits, a donor would be able to:
give half-a-million dollars in a single check to a joint fundraising
committee comprising a party’s presidential candidate, the party’s
national party committee, and most of the party’s state party

17 Id. During the 2013–2014 election cycle, McCutcheon told the Court “he again
wishe[d]t to contribute at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to noncandidate
political committees.” Id.
18 Id.
19 McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 Id. at 142.
21 Id. at 138.
22 Id. at 139 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for
political favors.” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985)).
23 Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)). In Citizens United,
the Supreme Court explained that influence or access to a candidate is not corruption
without more because “[i]t is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another
is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter
favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.” 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
24 McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
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committees. After the fundraiser, the committees are required to divvy
the contributions to ensure that no committee receives more than its
permitted share, but because party committees may transfer unlimited
amounts of money to other party committees of the same party, the halfa-million-dollar contribution might nevertheless find its way to a single
committee’s coffers. That committee, in turn, might use the money for
coordinated expenditures, which have no significant functional
difference from the party’s direct candidate contributions. The
candidate who knows the coordinated expenditure funding derives from
that single large check at the joint fundraising event will know precisely
25
where to lay the wreath of gratitude.

Moreover, the district court rejected McCutcheon’s argument that the
26
limits were not closely drawn to furthering the anticircumvention interest.
McCutcheon argued that the limits were unconstitutionally low because,
for example, if he had wanted to support a candidate in all 468 federal races
in 2006, the aggregate limits then in effect would have restricted
McCutcheon’s contributions to $85.29 per candidate—an amount far below
27
a limit held unconstitutionally low in Randall v. Sorrell.
The district
court found this argument unpersuasive because, even conceding the fact
that McCutcheon would be so limited, he “remain[ed] able to volunteer,
join political associations, and engage in independent expenditures” as
28
means of expressing his political beliefs.
Following the district court’s decision, McCutcheon and the RNC
29
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
II.

ANALYSIS

Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment in McCutcheon in an
30
opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.
The Supreme
Court first rejected the invitation to revisit Buckley because of its limited
31
utility in analyzing the constitutionality of FECA’s aggregate limits.
Buckley itself only dedicated three sentences to aggregate limits because
25 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court
acknowledged that gratitude is not itself corruption, the parties involved could implicitly
agree to the above hypothetical as a means of masking quid pro quo corruption. Id.
26 Id. at 141.
27 Id. at 141 n.5 (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 239 (2006)).
28 Id. at 142.
29 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)
(“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction
in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges.”).
30 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1436.
31 Id. at 1445.
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they “ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties.” In
contrast, the McCutcheon Court had been directly confronted with the
33
constitutionality of aggregate limits.
The Court noted that subsequent
legislative developments since Buckley warranted full review of the
34
aggregate limits’ constitutionality. Base limits on contributions made to
political committees were enacted in 1976 “in part to prevent
circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this Court
35
upheld in Buckley.”
As further evidence of subsequent legislative
developments, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “[t]he 1976 Amendments
also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or
36
controlling multiple affiliated political committees[]” that could be used
37
to “direct funds in excess of the individual base limits.”
The Federal
Election Commission has also enacted earmarking regulations that prevent
a donor from making contributions to political committees supporting a
candidate for whom the donor has reached the base contribution limits “if
the individual knows that ‘a substantial portion [of his contribution] will be
38
contributed to, or expended on behalf of,’ that candidate.” Finally, the
Court noted that Buckley did not involve an overbreadth challenge to the
39
aggregate limits. Each of these considerations led the Court to conclude
40
that Buckley should not control the outcome of this case.
The Court, however, disagreed with Buckley that aggregate limits only
41
pose a “quite modest restraint” on political speech.
At the current
aggregate limits, a donor could not support ten candidates up to the full
amount permitted under the base limits; moreover, after the donor reached
the aggregate limit, he or she was prevented from further supporting
42
additional candidates through contributions of even one dollar.
The
aggregate limits thus worked substantial harm upon a would-be speaker
from engaging in protected First Amendment activity well within the base
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976)) (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1446.
Id. (quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197–198 (1981) (plurality
opinion)).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1447.
38 Id. (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(h)(2) (2014)) (alteration in original).
39 Id. The doctrine of overbreadth states generally that if the statute under which the
speaker is prosecuted “sweeps in” too much protected speech that should not be covered,
then the statute is unconstitutional. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1972). The
concern motivating the doctrine is that “persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions
provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.” Id. at 521.
40 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447.
41 Id. at 1448 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976)).
42 Id.
32
33
34
35
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limits Congress found to prevent corruption or the appearance of
43
corruption.
Moreover, the Court found unpersuasive the government’s arguments
44
that the aggregate limits furthered its interest in preventing corruption.
The aggregate limits did not further the goal of preventing corruption per se
because once a donor reached the limits, the law prevented him from
45
contributing even one additional dollar. This, the Court stated, is contrary
to Congress’s conclusion that all contributions at or below the base limit do
46
not pose a “cognizable risk of corruption.”
The government was also
unable to justify the aggregate limit as necessary for preventing
47
circumvention of the base limits.
Post-Buckley campaign finance
legislation prohibited each hypothetical scenario involving a donor
48
circumventing the base limits.
For instance, earmarking and
antiproliferation laws prevent the hypothetical donor channeling donations
49
to a candidate through various political action committees (PACs).
Attempts to donate to unaffiliated PACs would dilute the corrupting
influence of the donation because the donor’s contribution would be pooled
with other contributions and often times dispersed to candidates other than
50
the intended target. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a donor would make a
large number of contributions to different PACs in order to funnel a small
amount of money to one candidate when the donor is free to make an
unlimited amount of expenditures on behalf of the same candidate without
51
worrying the money would go to some other recipient.
43 Id. The Court said that “[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can simply
contribute less money to more people” to avoid the constitutional problem posed by the
aggregate limits because “[t]o require one person to contribute at lower levels than others
because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on
broader participation in the democratic process.” Id. at 1449.
44 Id. at 1450. The Court also reaffirmed the principle that the government may only
permissively regulate actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption: “As Buckley explained,
Congress may permissibly seek to rein in ‘large contributions [that] are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.’” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 26 (alteration in original)). In contrast, “[s]pending large sums of money in
connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.” Id.
45 Id. at 1452.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1453.
48 Id. at 1452–53.
49 Id. at 1453; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
50 Id. at 1453.
51 Id. at 1454 (“On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational actor would
engage in such machinations. . . . [A] dedicated donor spent $500,000 . . . to add just
$26,000 to [a hypothetical candidate] Smith’s campaign coffers. That same donor . . . could
have spent his entire $500,000 advocating for Smith, without the risk that his selected PACs
would choose not to give to Smith . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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The Court also found that the government failed to show proper fit
52
between the aggregate limits and the furthered interest. The aggregate
limits would only work as an anticircumvention measure if it could be
shown that large amounts were being made and then subsequently
recontributed to the actual intended recipient; yet, the Court found that
experience suggests “recipients have scant interest in regifting donations
53
they receive.” In any event, Congress had a choice of many alternative
means to further the anticircumvention interest without “‘unnecessary
54
abridgment’ of First Amendment rights.” For instance, Congress could
55
have increased restrictions on transfers among candidates and PACs or
56
strengthened earmarking regulations.
Finally, the Court noted that
57
disclosure requirements “deter actual corruption” and “arm[] the voting
58
public with information” without imposing a “ceiling on speech” in the
59
same way that aggregate limits do.
Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote to declare the aggregate limits
unconstitutional, but wrote separately to voice his belief that Buckley
60
should be overruled.
Justice Thomas found the bifurcation between
political expenditures and contributions “tenuous” because both “‘generate
essential political speech’ by fostering discussion of public issues and
61
candidate qualifications.” For instance, Buckley’s rationale for allowing
restrictions on contributions—that contributions only serve to generally
express support without communicating the underlying basis of the

Id. at 1456.
Id. at 1457. As an example, the Court observed that “the NRSC [National
Republican Senatorial Committee] and DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee] spent just 7% of their total funds on contributions to candidates and the NRCC
[National Republican Congressional Committee] and DCCC [Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee] spent just 3%.” Id.
54 Id. at 1458 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
55 Id. at 1458–59. “One possible option for restricting transfers would be to require
contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated,
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients.” Id. at 1458.
56 Id. at 1459 (“Congress might also consider a modified version of the aggregate
limits, such as one that prohibits donors who have contributed the current maximum sums
from further contributing to political committees that have indicated they will support
candidates to whom the donor has already contributed.”).
57 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67).
58 Id. at 1460.
59 Id. at 1459.
60 Id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I adhere to the view that this Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Valeo denigrates core First Amendment speech and should be
overruled.” (citation omitted)).
61 Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)).
52
53
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support —cannot be squared with the fact that the Supreme Court “has
never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his position in order to
63
obtain full First Amendment protection.”
Justice Thomas also found
unpersuasive the argument that “[t]he quantity of communication by the
contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
64
contribution,” because contributions assist a candidate to increase the
65
dissemination of his or her message. Finally, Justice Thomas said that the
plurality opinion itself rejected the last remaining rationale for allowing
restrictions on contributions: contribution restrictions leave open alternative
66
channels for expression. In light of the plurality’s rejection of the last
remaining rationale for restricting contributions, Justice Thomas concluded
67
“Buckley is a rule without a rationale.”
Justice Breyer penned a dissenting opinion, which Justices Ginsburg,
68
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
The dissent argued that the plurality
opinion defined corruption “too narrowly” because the plurality ignored the
important First Amendment interests that the government has in regulating
69
money in politics.
In the eyes of the dissent, “the First Amendment
advances not only the individual’s right to engage in political speech, but
also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
70
collective speech matters.” Corruption, then, is any action that “derails
the essential speech-to-government-action tie” between the general public
will and its representatives, not the “limited definition of ‘corruption’” that
71
involves direct exchange of money for political favors. By safeguarding
the electoral process, campaign finance law ensures that the government
remains responsive to the larger public, rather than a select few
72
individuals.
According to the dissent, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence confirms
73
this broader understanding of corruption.
For example, the Supreme
Court upheld a ban on direct contributions by corporations in Federal
Election Commission v. Beaumont as a means of preventing individuals
who own or work at a corporation from using the corporate form to

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 2.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1463.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1463.
Id. at 1464; see supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1466.
Id. at 1467 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1468; accord id. at 1467.
Id. at 1468.
See id.
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74

circumvent individual base contribution limits. Beaumont characterized
the government’s interest as preventing “not only . . . quid pro quo
75
agreements, but also . . . undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.”
Similarly, “undue influence” was considered an acceptable government
interest in limiting coordinated campaign expenditures among candidates
76
77
and political parties, state law contribution limits, and soft money
78
contributions.
Thus, to the dissent, the plurality wrongly goes further
down the path that Citizens United started when it confines its definition of
79
corruption to actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.
The dissent also took issue with the plurality’s contention that
aggregate limits were no longer needed to further an anticircumvention
80
interest. To demonstrate the necessity of the limits, Justice Breyer listed
three hypotheticals, which he argued reflected gaps in campaign finance
81
law that can only be closed by aggregate limits.
In the first, a donor
legally contributes $1.2 million to a Joint Party Committee soliciting funds
for all federal and state political committees where the donor would
82
otherwise be capped at contributing $74,600.
In the second, a donor
legally contributes a total of $3.6 million to all of a party’s candidates for
the House or Senate during a single election cycle, with the understanding
83
that over $2.3 million of that total could be funneled to a single candidate.
In the third, party members could create 200 PACs, which would then in
turn solicit $10,000 donations each from a single donor and contribute it to
84
a single candidate.
Each hypothetical created the opportunity for the
donor to curry strong favor with the party of his or her choice and,
according to the dissent, invited the chance of quid pro quo favors from the
85
appreciative recipients that other existing checks could not guard against.

See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003).
Id. at 156 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,
441 (2001)) (citation omitted).
76 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441.
77 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000).
78 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010). “Soft money” is a term used to describe funds that went to political
parties for purposes other than directly helping a candidate; such activities include “voter
registration, ‘get out the vote’ drives, and advertising that d[oes] not expressly advocate a
federal candidate’s election or defeat.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469 (citing McConnell,
540 U.S. at 122–24).
79 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71.
80 Id. at 1471–72.
81 Id. at 1472–75.
82 Id. at 1472; accord id. 1472–73.
83 Id. at 1473–74.
84 Id. at 1474–75.
85 Id. at 1475–78.
74
75
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Finally, the dissent criticized the portion of the plurality that pertained
86
to the fit of the aggregate limits. While the plurality suggested that the
government could take any number of different steps other than aggregate
limits to further its anticircumvention interest without restricting as much
protected speech, the dissent observes that the plurality could not show
how each alternative “could effectively replace aggregate contribution
87
limits.” Moreover, each alternative had been “similarly available at the
time of Buckley” when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
aggregate limits in 1976, and yet the plurality made no attempt to
demonstrate how the same limits had become “poorly tailored” in
88
McCutcheon.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of McCutcheon, proponents of campaign finance reform
have decried McCutcheon as the latest example of the Supreme Court
rolling back necessary restrictions on campaign spending and gradually
89
chipping away at Buckley v. Valeo. This latter concern seems unlikely at
this juncture for two reasons.
First, McCutcheon is not as hostile towards Buckley as some initially
feared. Justice Thomas appears to be the only member of the Supreme
Court ready to overturn Buckley; the four justices in dissent certainly would
uphold a constitutional challenge to base contribution limits, and the
plurality is still willing to accept that base contributions do in fact serve as
a necessary measure for preventing actual or apparent corruption. In fact,
the plurality opinion assumed the constitutionality of the base contributions
in order to highlight throughout its opinion the problems with aggregate
90
limits.
McCutcheon also never stated the applicable scrutiny to be
applied to aggregate contributions because the plurality found that the
Id. at 1479.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., David Schultz, Amend the Constitution to Restore the Democracy the
Roberts
Court
Killed,
THE
HILL
(Aug.
29,
2014,
6:01
AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/216168-amend-the-constitution-torestore-the-democracy-the (“The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts continued to
hack away at efforts such as McCain-Feingold to limit the power of money in
politics. Citizens United and McCutcheon are only the most recent examples of how the
Court is letting money and privilege entrench itself, preventing the political system from
functioning.”).
90 E.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (plurality opinion) (“To put it in the simplest
terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and
general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within
the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption.”); id. at 1452
(noting that “Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that
contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption.”).
86
87
88
89
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aggregate limits could not even satisfy the lower, “closely drawn” standard
91
applied to contribution limits.
Significantly, McCutcheon did not
explicitly state, nor implicitly suggest, that base contributions ought to be
analyzed under strict scrutiny—which would make it more challenging for
the government to justify restrictions on base contributions. McCutcheon
still leaves room for the government to utilize base contributions to combat
actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. Whatever effects McCutcheon
may have on the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence going
92
forward, providing the means to overrule Buckley does not appear to be
one of them.
Second, McCutcheon left undisturbed—indeed, it even spoke
favorably of—components of campaign finance law pertaining to
93
disclosure.
This portion of the majority’s opinion is by no means an
academic exercise. It is true that, depending on one’s perspective, money
is either the most powerful form of political speech or is an extraordinarily
94
powerful tool for enabling effective political speech. Yet, money is not
the be-all, end-all form of speech that critics of Citizens United suggest it
is. American politics is rife with examples of high-profile elections in
which other, more cost-effective forms of speech trumped well-financed
95
96
speech.
To put it simply, “dollars do not vote.”
Under a First

91 Id. at 1446 (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s
stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the
‘closely drawn’ test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards
in this case.”).
92 It remains to be seen to what extent McCutcheon limits the ability of state laws that
impose similar aggregate limits on campaign contributions. Federal courts have imposed
preliminary injunctions against enforcement of state aggregate limits in both Wisconsin and
Minnesota. See CRG Network v. Barland, No. 14-C-719, 2014 WL 4391193, at *1 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 5, 2014); Seaton v. Wiener, No. 14-1016 (DWF/JSM), 2014 WL 2081898, at *1
(D. Minn. May 19, 2014). It is likely that other state aggregate limits will be found
similarly preempted by McCutcheon—including state courts following the Supreme Court’s
decision. For an examination of how state courts perform preemption analysis, see Stephen
M. DeGenaro, Obstacle Preemption: Federal Purpose in State Courts, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y ONLINE (forthcoming 2015).
93 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459–60 (“Disclosure requirements burden speech,
but—unlike the aggregate limits—they do not impose a ceiling on speech. For that reason,
disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or
quantities of speech. With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective
means of arming the voting public with information.” (citations omitted)).
94 EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 445 (4th ed.
2011) (“Most effective speech—publishing a newspaper, buying a newspaper ad . . .
printing and distributing leaflets, and the like—requires spending money. . . . Restrictions
on spending money to speak thus diminish people’s ability to speak effectively.”).
95 In the week leading up to the 2012 Presidential Election, Governor Romney’s
campaign ran a targeted advertisement in Ohio related to the alleged closing of a Jeep plant
in Ohio. The Washington Post published an article shortly thereafter discrediting the
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Amendment regime where the best ideas emerge when speech enjoys
97
robust protection, being able to critically evaluate the message and its
speaker will always provide a check against even the most pervasive and
well-funded message. As long as the First Amendment continues to uphold
reasonable regulations requiring disclosure of campaign contributions,
candidates and voters will be armed with facts they can argue show why
they believe there is too much money in politics. Nothing but their own
desire to spread the message will limit the scope of their speech.
This latter point is crucial. If one imagines a counterfactual scenario
in which McCutcheon upheld the aggregate limits, an unknown number of
people would be prohibited from participating as fully in the political
process as they otherwise might wish. Moreover, although some people do
not find large contributions to be a virtue of modern politics, others do, and
they may wish to participate robustly in that manner. So, in this respect,
McCutcheon is more protective of political speech than the counterfactual
scenario because all speakers can participate to the fullest extent they
desire. Rejecting aggregate limits ultimately affords greater protection to
advertisement for deceptively portraying the facts surrounding the plant. See Glenn Kessler,
4 Pinocchios for Mitt Romney’s Misleading Ad on Chrysler and China, WASH. POST (Oct.
30, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/4-pinocchiosfor-mitt-romneys-misleading-ad-on-chrysler-and-china/2012/10/29/2a153a04-21d7-11e2ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html. Although the author is not privy to specific numbers, it is
far more likely that the Romney campaign spent more money on its media buy in the
quintessential presidential election swing state than the total amount of money: (i) paid by
the Washington Post for the salary of the staff to investigate and write the article, and (ii)
time spent by numerous Ohio residents who read the article and shared it by email or social
media. As a resident of Ohio, the author can confirm that the Washington Post article factchecking the Romney ad was just as pervasive as the television buy made by the campaign.
From a purely financial perspective, the speech associated with discrediting the Romney ad
proved far more cost-effective than the ad itself—and given the fact that President Obama
carried Ohio during the 2012 election, it may have been more effective from a tactical
perspective for supporters of President Obama to share the Washington Post article.
More recently, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor lost his seat to David Brat in
Virginia’s Seventh District, despite outspending Brat by a ratio of more than 25 to 1. See
Jon Greenberg, Rare Feat: Cantor Spent more at Steakhouses than Opponent Did on
Campaign,
POLITIFACT
(June
11,
2014,
4:49
PM),
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jun/11/chuck-todd/rare-feat-cantorspent-more-steakhouses-opponent-d/. Brat’s success is largely attributed to a strong
message that portrayed Cantor as a Washington insider who did not spend enough time in
his district. See How Did Virginia Underdog David Brat Beat DC Political Player Eric
Cantor?, FOX NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/11/howdid-virginia-underdog-david-brat-beat-dc-political-player-eric-cantor/.
96 See How Did Virginia, supra note 96.
97 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
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citizens wishing to engage in collective self-governance—the very ideal the
dissent seeks to protect through the imposition of aggregate limits. When
speech is afforded maximum protection, the processes of collective selfgovernance, such as counter-speech and other forms of vigorous public
debate, are safeguarded against government evaluation. The People, not
the judiciary, are then empowered to govern themselves by making
98
evaluative decisions about the worth of any type of speech.

98 STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 15 (2005) (“The concept of active liberty . . . refers to a sharing of a nation’s
sovereign authority among its people.”).

